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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, IN THE INTEREST 
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ROBERT GEARY LONDON and 
SANDRA CLEGG LOINDON, 
Petitioners and Appellants. 
vs. 
BARBARA BELL, Guardian ad Litem 
for JEANNE BELL, 




An appeal from an order of the Juvenile Court of the 
First District in and for Weber County, Utah. 
E. F. ZEIGLER, Judge 
KEITH E. MURRAY 
Eccles Building 
Ogden, Utah 
DAVID E. BEAN 
BEAN AND BEAN 
50 North MainJ Street 
Layton, Utah 
Attorneys for Appellants. 
Attorney for Respondent. 
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE 
This is an appeal by the petitioners-appellants, Robert 
Geary London and Sandra Clegg London, from a decree 
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and order of the Juventi.le Court of the First District in and 
for Weber County, State of Utah, holding that Maralee 
London, a minor child now in the care, custody and control 
of the petitioners and appellants, is not an abandoned and 
deserted child, and ordering the return of said minor 
child to the care, custody and control of her natural moth-
er, Jeanne Bell. 
DISPOSITION OF LOWER COURT 
The case was tried to the judge, and from the finding 
that said minor child was not an abandoned and deserted 
child and a decree providing for the return of said minor 
child to her natural mother, Jeanne Bell, the petitioners-
appellants bring this appeal. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Petitioners and appellants seek reversal of the decree 
of the Juvenile Court and the order returning Maralee 
London to her natural mother, Jeanne Bell, on the ground 
that said minor was and is now an abandoned and deserted 
child, and that it is in the best interest and welfare of said 
minor child that the natural mother be permanently de-
prived of her custody. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The child in question and designated herein as Mara-
lee London was born on the 12th day of February, 1962, 
in the State of California, as the natural child of Jeanne 
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Bell, \vho at the time of delivery was fourteen years old 
(T. 28). Throughout the pregnancy, the natural mother, 
Jeanne Bell, and her mother, Barbara Bell, discussed with 
their family doctor the possibility and desirabiliy of plac-
ing the child for adoption (T. 22-23). The natural mother 
claims to know who the natural father is, but no marriage 
was planned, and the natural mother and her guardian 
made no plans to provide a home for the baby (T. 17, 20, 
10, 39). Petitioners-appellants were interested in adopting 
a child and were advised by relatives to contact Genevive 
~teierstein and Dr. Morris, who worked with her in the 
placing of children for adoption (T. 76, 77). Petitioners-
appellants were then advised on the 12th day of FebruarY, 
1962, that the baby they had been waiting for had been 
born and that they should go to California, and on the 13th 
day of February, 1962, they went to the hospital to see the 
baby (T. 69). At the specific request of the natural mother, 
Jeanne Bell, and her guardian, Barbara Bell, petitioners 
were introduced to Jeanne Bell in her hospital room on 
the 14th day of February, 1962 (T. 5). At that time peti-
tioners presented to Jeanne Bell a document purporting to 
be a preliminary consent for adoption (Exh. 1), which 
reads as follows: 
TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN: 
My name is Jeanne Bell, and I reside at Sunland, 
County of Los Angeles, State of California. I gave 
birth to a child on February 12, 1962, in Burbank 
Community Hospital in the City of Burbank, State 
of California, for the deilvery of this child. The 
father of this child is unknown. 
I have been informed that a Mr. Robert Geary Lon-
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don and ~andra London, his wife, residing at Roy, 
Utah, desire to adopt the child. They have come to 
Los Angeles immediately after being notified of its 
birth for the purpose of taking the child back to 
Roy, Utah. I believe that Mr. and Mrs. London 
would be good parents and would give my child 
proper care, support, and education. They have one 
child in their family, and I believe that this child 
would add much joy and happiness to their lives 
and that this arrangement is desirable for all parties 
concerned. 
It is my expectation to deliver the child into their 
custody as soon as practical after its birth, with the 
un1derstanding that they will take the child to their 
home in Roy, Utah, and will institute adoption 
proceedings there shortly after they arrive home. 
I understand, however, that under the Utah law, 
the petition for adoption cannot be granted until 
after the child has lived with the adopting parents 
for at least one year. 
I also understand that the adoption cannot be com-
pleted without my written consent, and that no 
other consent than mine is necessary as I am un-
married. It is my present intention to sign such 
consent when presented to me by the appropriate 
authority. 
I do not expect and will not accept any payment or 
other consideration for agreeing to this adoption 
or for giving such consent. I am informed, how-
ever, that Mr. and Mrs. London inttend to pay for 
my doctor and hospital bills in connection with the 
birth of the child upon the basis that if they had a 
natural child of their own at the time, they would 
be put to that expense. 
The entire adoption procedure and the legal rights 
and liabilities which arsie from it are thoroughly 
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understood by me, and in particular the fact that 
after the adoption I shall have no rights of any kind 
to custody or visitation and that the child from 
the time of the adoption shall be legally in the re-
lationship of a total stranger to me, and I shall 
have no more right in respect to it than it would 
to a strange or unrelated child. I have also been inl.. 
formed and understand that this statement is pure-
ly a statement of my present intention and that I 
have the legal right to refuse to sign my consent to 
the adoption when it is presented to me. I do now 
fully intend, however, to cooperate in every way in 
completing the proposed adoption above outlined. 
Dated this 14th day of February, 1962, at Burbank, 
California. 
(s) Jeanne Bell 
(s) Mrs. Barbara Bell 
(Notary clause) 
The natural mother, Jeanne Bell, and her guardian, Bar-
bara Bell, signed the document only after having read it 
and only after a paragraph or clause was explained to 
them by Genevive Meierstein (T. 10, Meierstein Dep. 11). 
l.,he guardian, Barbara Bell, who is also objector-respond-
ent. not only concurred in, but encouraged the foregoing 
proceeding (T. 10, 37-39). For approximately ten monlths 
petitioners-appeallants proceeded to become parents, 
guardians, and family to this infant (T. 92), and without 
knowledge of any problems in California, filed their peti-
tion for adoption and obtained an order appointing a com-
missioner to take the consent of the natural mother (T. 94, 
100: Exh. 8). On that same afternoon of November 21, 
1962, the natural mother, Jeanne Bell, mailed an envelope 
addressed to counsel for petitioners-appellants containing 
exhibits 2 and 3, requesting that the minor child be re-
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turned to her (T. 32, Exh. 8). The petition for adoption 
had already been filed, and appellants refused to deliver 
the baby to the objector-respondent. On the 28th day of 
January, 1963, an order dismising the petition! for adoption 
v.rithout prejudice was signed and entered, the objector-re-
spondent having retained counsel in Ogden, Utah. On or 
about the 22nd day of March, 1963, a petition was filed in 
the J uvenlile Court of the First District in and forr Weber 
County, alleging that Maralee London was an abandoned 
and deserted child and that the natural mother, Jeanne 
Bell, was not a fit and proper person for the care, custody 
and control of said minor child. From an adverse ruling 
of the Juvenile Court this appeal is brought. However, the 
decree also provided that the temporary custody and con-
trol of the said Maralee London should remain with peti-
tioners-appellants should the decision of the Juvenile Court 
be appealed to the Supreme Court of the State of Utah, and 
said minor child is presently residing with petitioners. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
MARALEE L.QNDON WAS AN ABANDONED AND 
DESERTED CHILD, AND THE JUVENILE COURT 
ERRED IN FAILING TO SO HOLD. 
The Juvenile Court has broad and comprehensive lat-
itude and discretion in determining custody of a child, and 
it may order that the natural parent be permanently de-
prived of custody and that the child be placed in a family 
for adoption without consent of the parent. Devereaux v. 
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Brown. 2 U.2d 334, 273 P.2d 185. Where parents are perma-
nently deprived of child custody, their parental rights are 
terminated, and consent to proposed adoption is unneces-
sary. Jacob v. State Public Welfare Commission, 7 U.2d 
304, 323 P.2d 720, U.C.A. 5·5-10-32. 
The Utah Code Annotated, 1953, Section 78-30-4, 5, 
provides for adoption without the consent of the natural 
parents based upon a finding that said child was deserted 
by its natural parents. Also, under the provisions of 55-
10-30, U.C.A., the Juvenile Court has the power and the 
duty to determine whether or not a child has been neglect-
ed or deserted; and further, under sub-section ( 4) the court 
has the power to place the child in the custody of a guard-
ian other than the child's natural parents. A neglected 
child is defined at 55-10-6, U.C.A., as follows: 
A child who is abandoned by his parent, guardian, 
or custodian. A child who lacks proper parental 
care by reason of the fault or habits of the parent, 
guardian, or custodian. A child whose parent, 
guardian, or custodian neglects or refuses to pr~ 
vide proper or necessary subsistence, education, 
medical or surgical care or other care necessary for 
his health, morals or well-being. 
From the very beginning of her pregnancY, Jeanne 
Bell and her mother discussed with Dr. Ralph Sloan:e the 
fact that this child was to be placed for adoption (Sloan 
Dep. 25, 33). They knew that arrangements for adoption 
were being made early in the pregnancy by Dr. Clifford J. 
Morris (T. 46). They had ample time to seek legal counsel 
and to determine what procedure would be in the best in-
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terest of the minor child. When the preliminary consent for 
adoption was presented in that hospital room, Jeanne Bell 
and her mother read the document, asked questions about 
it, and then signed it before Marian P. Kringle, a Notary 
Public. Their intent at the time they signed that document 
is beyond dispute, and the testimony of Barbara Bell at 
the hearing shows a complete change of attitude on her 
part as follows: 
Q. You state in your letter, Exhibit No. 3, that 
you are willing to support your daughter in her 
attempt to regain custody of this child, but at the 
time this child was born and during the pregnancy, 
apparently you were not willing to support her and 
her desires at that time, is this correct? 
A. Well, it was, but that wasn't really the 
reason. I think I was trying to get my little girl 
back like she was before and forget about it, be-
cause she was just thirteen when it happened, and 
fourteen! when she had her baby, and a girl can 
grow up an awful lot at thirteen, fourteen and fif-
teen. She will be fifteen in June. All this happened 
in a three-year period, and the baby is still only 
thirteen months old now. She has developed from 
a thirteen-year-old girl to a young womanr. I feel 
she can care for it now where before I didn't. 
And again, at page 45: 
Q. Now did you have this same belief at the 
time you signed Exhibit No. 17. 
A. I am sure I didn't think about it. In fact, 
I hadn't thought about it until actually at the time 
I didn't think about it. The situation was pretty 
bad. I believe I felt at the time that because of her 
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youth, of her age at the time the baby was born, 
that was the big factor. If she had been older she 
would have had a life of her own. At that time she 
would have been old enough to know what she 
wanted and asserted her own rights, and otherwise 
I would have had an altogether different attitude 
if she had been older. 
The natural mother, Jeanne Bell, gives a little different 
view of her attitude at Page 4 of the Transcript: 
Q. At the time that these discussions were 
had, did you advise anlYone of your intent to place 
the baby out for adoption? 
A. You mean, did I tell anyone I would have 
the baby adopted? 
Q. Yes. 
A. The doctor thought I should place the baby 
with the Londons. 
Q. Now was this be£ore the birth of the baby? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Did you advise anyone besides your doctor? 
A. We didn't talk about it at home. We were 
planning to leave it up to the doctor. 
Q. Were any provisions made for keeping the 
baby at the time of its birth? 
A. No. 
Q. None whatsoever? 
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A. My mother had made none, but I was plan-
ning on keeping it and fighting to ge my baby back 
when I could, and as far as I knew I had no legal 
way then of keeping it, so I planned someday I 
would try and get it back if I could. 
And again, at page 7: 
Q. So what You are saying, Miss Bell, in effect, 
is at the time this happened, the Londons happened 
to be a convenient vehicle for someone to take your 
baby until such time (as) you wanted it back, is 
this correct? 
A. No, that isn't. I wanted my baby, but what 
I really planned to do was think it over, but like 
I say, I was young and I really didn't realize actu-
ally what I was doing. It was right at that time 
everyone was trying to make my decisions for me 
and running my life for me, and that I didn't have 
a mind of my own, and I guess I wasn't in a po-
sition to go on my own. 
Q. You feel now at fourteen months later that 
this position has completely changed. Is this cor-
rect? 
A. Yes, I do. I feel like I can make arrange-
ments for its care, and I have more faith. I know 
what some of :my legal rights are now. 
'rhe Londons received the baby from the hospital staff on 
the 15th day of February, 1962, and from that date until 
the 26th day of November, 1962, there was not even an 
inquiry made to the Londons or to their counsel by the 
natural mother, and even after Exhibits 2 and 3 were 
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mailed. no legal steps were taken by the natural mother 
to obtain the custody of her child. Petitioners-appellants 
were the ones who filed a petition in the Juvenile Court 
to bring the matter to a conclusion. 
Abandonment of a child as ground for adoption with-
out parental consent imports any conduct of a natural 
parent which evinces a settled purpose to forego all par-
ental duties and relinquish all parental claims to the child. 
Shumway v. Farley, 68 Ariz. 159, 203 P.2d 507. As was 
stated at In re Potter, 149 P. page 23 at page 24: 
Abandonment does not necessarily mean that a 
parent has no interest in the child's welfare, it 
means rather a withdrawal or neglect of parental 
duties. It means a withholding of care and protec-
tion, of sympathy and affection. 
In the case of Harrison v. Harker, 142, P. 716, the 
court in a split decision returned the child to its natural 
parents, but two comments illustrate the case at bar per-
fectly. At page 736 it is said: 
Since you have abandoned the child or otherwise 
voluntarily divested Yourself of its custody and 
permitted others to provide it with a home, main-
tain, clothe, feed and care for it as their own, the 
child's interest and not your desires or your mere 
naked legal rights shall control and direct the dis-
cretion of the court in the premises. 
And again. at page 741, the court stated: 
Suppose the mother should again meet with mis-
fortune such as in her judgment would justify her 
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12 
to abandon the child, would she not again abandon 
it precisely as she did to further her own welfare. 
In the present case the natural mother, Jeanne Bell, did 
have a change of heart after the first hearing, as expressed 
in her letter of April22, 1963, marked Exhibit 9, as follows: 
Dear Mr. Murray: I am writing in regards to a cus-
tody case you are representing me in. 
Because of personal problems, I am very sorry to 
tell you I have decided to discontinue trying to get 
my child back. When I am eighteen I plan to repay 
my mother the money she has spent for this. I can't 
tell you how sorrY I am. I don't want to do this, 
but I have no other choice. 
If you have any fee unpaid, you will be paid. I'm 
so sorry I wasted your time, but it is impossible for 
me to continue. 
Please write me if you have any question. I'm very, 
very sorry. 
Sincerely, 
(s) Jeanne Bell 
The foregoing letter was never mailed to Mr. Murray, but 
instead was handed to Robert Geary London at Los An-
geles, California. 
In Kurtz, v. Christensen, 209 P. 340, 1922, a Utah case, 
the court found that the natural mother voluntarily per-
nlitted her doctor to place the child for adoption. There-
after, the natural mother married the child's father, and 
in a habeas corpus proceeding the court found that the na-
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tural mother had abandoned her child, and the decision 
was affirmed on appeal. The court in upholding the de-
cision of Hummel v. Parrish, 43 U. 373, 134 P. 898, quoted 
at page 344: 
Though the presumption is that it is for the best 
interest of the child and society that it remain with 
its natural parents during minority (nevertheless) 
where a parent has surrendered her child to others 
in infancY and it has been allowed to remain with 
others until new ties of mutual affection are formed, 
the child's welfare will control the parents' rights 
in habeas corpus proceedings for its return. 
Jensen v. Early, reported at 228 P. 217, is a Utah case 
decided in 1924 with facts very similar to the case now 
before the court. In that case the natural mother was three 
years older than the n1atural mother in this present case. 
In the Jensen case demand was made for the child six 
months after its birth, and in the case at bar, ten months 
after birth. In the Jensen case the natural mother reached 
her majority under the law within six months after the 
child was born; in the present case, the natural mother, 
Jeanne Bell, is now sixteen years of age and has not seen 
her child since the 14th day of February, 1962. In the 
Jensen case the district court found that there had been 
an abandonment, but the decision! was reversed by the Su-
preme Court holding that there had been no abandonment. 
Abandonment was there defined as follows: 
Abandonment in such cases, ordinarily means that 
the parent has placed the child on some doorstep 
or left it in some convenient place in the hope that 
someone will find it and take charge of it, or has 
abandoned it entirely to chance or to fate. To make 
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arrangements beforehand with some proper and 
competent person to have the care and the custody 
of the child it not an abandonment of it as that term 
is ordinarily understood. 
In the recent case of Wilson v. Pierce, 14 U.2d 317, 
383 P. 2d 925, the natural mother was a married woman 
whose expected child was fathered by someone other than 
her husband. She was anxious for the expected child to be 
\Vell taken care of in an adequate home, and after failing 
to place the child with a family in Texas, succeeded in 
placing her expected child with an Ogden, Utah, couple un-
der an agreement much less comprehensive than Exhibit 
1 in the present case. In the following twenty-four months 
1\Irs. Pierce kept in contact with the Wilsons, and on one 
occasion even visited her natural daughter. However, the 
Wilsons took no steps toward adoption until the natural 
mother requested the return of her child two years later. 
The same types of defenses were interposed there as in the 
case presently before the court. In affirming an order of 
the district court granting the adoption based on abandon-
lnent, the court said, at page 927: 
The significant fact here is that the adoption is not 
grounded upon the written consent as such. Section 
78-30-5 1 U.C.A. 1953, provides that a deserted child 
may be adopted without the consent of its parents. 
This is a practical necessity which the law wisely 
recognizes for the relief of children who might be 
abandoned to a worse fate than being so rescued. 
In the interest of encouraging rescue and care of 
children left without parental refuge, it is not the 
policy of the law to impose undue hazards upon 
people disposed to come to their aid by leaving 
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them at the mercy of the whim or caprice of a na-
tural parent who has abandoned his child. 
In referring to the definition of abandonment given in the 
Jensen case, the court further stated, at page 928: 
We see no reason for disagreement with the lan~­
guage as applied to the particular fact situations. 
But it was not meant to prevent a finding of the 
true facts where there has been an actual desertion 
or abandonment. A distinction should be made be-
tween leaving a child under circumstances which 
show a continuing intention to fulfill the duties of 
parenthood by seeing to it that the child is cared for 
and of possibly resuming such responsibility if that 
becomes necessary; as distinguished from an intent 
to completely and permanently abandon a child 
and parental responsibilities to it where there is in 
fact the latter type of abandonment, it matters not 
whether it is to a situation where others may be ex-
pected to care for the child, or it is left to the mere 
chance of whatever fate might befall it. Whether 
there has been such an abandonment and what is 
to be done with the child depends upon the facts 
and circumstances of each case. 
Maralee London is now two years old. She has never 
lived with her natural mother, and the only parents she 
knows are the petitioners-appellants. The court, in quot-
ing from the Kurtz case, once again affirmed the principle 
that the best interest of the child is always the principal 
concern. Here, as in that case, Maralee London knows no 
other parents, and the present wholesome relationship ex-
isting between petitioners-appellants and said minor child 
should not be ignored. 
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In its Memorandum Decision, the Juvenile Court 
pointed out two determining factors basic to the legal con-
cept of abandonment (Record, p. 16). The court first came 
to grips with the significance of Exhibit No. 1, but dis-
nlissed its evidentiary value based on' Jeanne Bell's youth. 
Section 224 of the California Civil Code provides that 
the consent of the natural mother of an illegitimate child 
is the only consent necessary for the adoption of said child. 
Section 226 further provides: 
A parent who is a minor shall have the right to 
sign a consent for the adoption of his or her child, 
and such consent shall not be subject to revocation 
by reason of such minority. 
It would then appear a fortiori that a minor who abandons 
her child is not less gulity of abandonment by reason of her 
youth and minority. The doctrine of abandonment is not 
balm for the wounds of an erring mother, but rather for 
the protection of an infant child whose individual rights 
and survival depend upon society offering protection 
\Vhere those individually responsible have failed to do so. 
Petitioners-appellants therefore contend that the Juvenile 
Court minconstrued the evidentiary value of Exhibit 1 and 
gave great weight to the youth of the natural mother at 
the time of the signing. 
The second factor influencing the decision of the Ju-
venile Court was the elapsed time of ten months between 
the signing of Exhibit 1 and the deman(f for the return of 
the child to the natural mother. The court then stated 
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(Record, p. 16): "This lapse of time, without more, would 
not be decisive," and the case of Taylor v. Waddoups, 241 
P.2d 157 (1952) is quoted as supporting that proposition. 
However, in the next paragraph of the Memorandum De-
cision and on the same page, the Juvenile Court stated, 
•·The Taylor case can, however, be distingushed success-
fullY from the one at bar on its facts." 
Jeanne Bell's testimony at the hearing shows that 
there was much more than just an elapsed time of ten 
months, and the testimony of Dr. Sloane taken by deposi-
tion shows that there is much more to Jeanne Bell than 
the mature sophistication she presents in the courtroom. 
Jeanne Bell's own testimony shows that she knew 
\vhat she was doing when she signed Exhibit 1 (T. 16, 17): 
Q. Would you identify for us Exhibit No. 5? 
A. Yes, that is a letter I wrote the Londons. 
Q. You state in that letter, do you not, Miss 
Bell, that at the time this transaction took place in 
California you didn't really know what was going 
on, is that correct? 
A. I wasn't fully aware of everything, like I 
told you before. 
Q. Well, but you did understand, Miss Bell, 
that you were abandoning the care, custody and the 
oontrol of this child, did you not? You knew this? 
A. I knew that I had a year to make up IllY 
mind, after I signed the papers. 
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Q. You knew that the intention of the Londons 
was to pursue this didn't you? You knew that's 
w~at they were. there for, and you knew that by so 
doing at that time that you were abandoning the 
role of the mother over this child, didn't you? 
A. Well, yes. 
Q. You were conscious of this in the hospital, 
weren't you? 
A. Well. 
Q. You knew that the people were down there 
from Utah and that they intended to take the baby 
back, isn't that corect? And you knew that by so 
doing that your role as a mother would be nil with 
respect to this child while it was in their care, cus-
tody and control. Is this true? 
A. Yes. 
As was said in In reAdoption of Cannon, 243 Iowa 828, 53 
N.W.2d 877: 
Neither objector here pays any attention to the 
question of the child's interest. They both stand 
apparently upon the naked, legal proposition that a 
parent may encourage and give written consent to 
an adoption and thereafter, before the adoption is 
fully consummated, arbitrarily change his mind 
and, without stating anY reason, figuratively speak-
ing, "pull the rug from under" petitioner, court, 
and child, and prevent consummation. Such inter-
pretation of our statutes is unthinkable. 
l\ leading case in this area with facts almost identical to 
the case now before the court is In re Holman's Adoption, 
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so Ariz. 201, 295 P.2d 372. There the natural mother 
\vas a minor, age 16, and deserted by her husband at the 
time the baby was born. She signed a consent to adoption 
knowing full well that the adoptive parents intended to 
move to California. The consent she signed apparently had 
a clause relating to the one-year period before final con-
sent, as in the case before the court, and the defenses 
raised by the natural mother are exactly the same defenses 
as have been raised by the respondent here. After exten-
sive review of the cases and authorities, some of which 
t.ave been quoted in this brief, the court stated : 
* * * We hold that a consent once givenJ by the par-
ent or other persons having the authority to give 
such consent may not be revoked after the child 
has been placed in the possession of the adoptive 
parents, except for legal cause shown, as where 
such consent was procured through fraud, undue 
influence, coercion, or other improper methods. 
In Ex parte Schultz, 181 P.2d 585, the court, after a thor-
ough review of authorities and cases dealing with the sub-
ject of revocation of consent, stated at page 586: 
Conversely, many tribunals have denied the right 
to revoke, and base such denials on ( 1) principles of 
contract; (2) estoppel or other equitable grounds; 
(3) public policy favoring adoption1 of children, par-
ticularly illegitimate children, or ( 4) the welfare of 
the child as apparent from the facts. 
In In re Adoption of n __ , 252 P.2d 223, our court 
had the occasion to pass upon the question, of withdrawal 
of consent as required by our statute. The child was two 
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years old when placed for adoption by someone other than 
the natural mother. However, the natural mother appeared 
in open court and gave her consent, but then ten months 
later withdrew her consent before the adoption was com-
pleted. While the facts are not exactlY similar to the case 
before the court, the court's acceptance of the principles 
stated in the Schultz case and the comments made thereon 
are equally applicable to the present case. The court stat-
ed, at page ____ : 
It would not be surprising that people who desire to 
adopt children may actually have greater affection 
for an adopted baby than a natural parent who 
might have designedly or even by misadventure 
happened to become a parent to a child who may 
not have been particularly wanted and may present 
some unplanned-for difficulties * * * Viewed in that 
light, there certainly have intervened "vested 
rights," and respondents have, in reliance upon rep-
resentations made, placed themselves in a different 
position, the undoing of which would cause them 
irreparable injury in the most real sense. Appel-
lant not only stood by and knowingly permitted, but 
actually encouraged such circumstances to even-
tuate, and further, formally executed the consent 
to adoption. Under such facts, she should in equity 
and good conscience be estopped to assert her rights 
to custodY. 
When a parent has failed to give the child the at-
tention and love normally to be expected, has aban-
doned its care to others, and by irresponsible con-
duct shown an unvvillingness or inability to 
measure up to parental responsibilities, these mat-
ters may be taken into consideration by the court 
in connection with other factors in determining the 
right to custody. 
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Once a child has been cast adrift and is without re-
sponsible parental care, the policy of the law should 
be to assist in every way in establishing a sa tisfac-
tory parent-child and family relationship. Adoptive 
parents should not be discouraged by construction 
of the law which would cause them to fear the con-
sequences of accepting a child because of the knowl-
edge that the fate of their efforts v,rould be at the 
will of the natural parent. 
The same sentiments were expressed in the case of In re 
.. 4doption of a Minor, 144 F. 2d, page 650: 
It is apparent that if in particular cases the un-
stable whims and fancies of natural mothers were 
permitted, first, to put in motion all the flow of 
parental love and expenditure of time, energy and 
money which is involved in adoption, and then, as 
casually, put the whole process in reverse, the 
major purpose of the statute would be largely de-
feated. * * * A premium would, instead, be put 
upon the emotional instability which produces il-
legitimates; ot say nothing of the possibilities for 
racketeering which such an interpretation of the 
law would put in reach of those who may be crim-
inal in their tendencies as well as lacking in the 
qualities of parenthood. 
Though Jeanne Bell has stoutly denied her intention to 
take money for this child, her continual harrassmentt of 
Dr. Sloane, as stated in his deposition, and the belief of Dr. 
Morris that Jeanne Bell called him and offered to settle the 
matter for $500.00 represents the possible fruition of the 
fears expressed by Judge Miller in the above-quoted case 
(Morris Dep. 10, 11). 
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In In re Maxwell's Adoption, 176 N.Y.S.2d, 281, a mar-
ried woman became pregnant by a man who was not her 
husband, told her obstetrician to place the baby for adop-
tion. She left the hospital and was not heard from until 
the adoptive parents commenced adoption proceedings 
\vherein the natural mother was asked to participate, at 
vv hich time she revoked her consent to such proceedings 
and requested the return of her child. At page 283, the 
court stated: 
The mother did not, it is true, leave her child 
on a doorstep, but surely an abandonment may be 
established by proof of conduct less drastic than 
that. Just as plainly the settled purpose to be rid 
of all parental obigations and forego all parental 
rights spells out abandonment under Section III. 
POINT II 
THE NATURAL MOTHER IS NOT A FIT AND 
PROPER PERSON FOR THE CARE, CUSTODY AND 
CONTROL OF SAID MINOR CHILD. 
From the testimony given at the hearing, the Juve-
nile Court concluded that Jeanne Bell was mature enough 
to care for this minor child, and with this conclusion we 
find ourselves in partial agreement. But the maturity ex-
hibited by Jeanne Bell is a sophistication born of expe-
rience, rare in a girl of her age. When interrogated by the 
court relative to the cost of rearing a minor child her at-
titude was that of sheer guess, and her answer so indicated; 
v ... hen asked questions concerning the population of her 
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immediate community, she couldn't even given an estimate 
(T. 28, 29). Nowhere in the transcript is there evidence 
of the type of maturity the court states, and one can only 
conclude that it was an observable maturity except for the 
testimony of Dr. Clarence Doxey Swanner, who testified 
that Jeanne Bell "is quite mature" and that "she is as ma-
ture as a fifteen-year-old could be." Dr. Swanner's testi-
tnony was otherwise absolutely neutral, as shown in pages 
101 to 104 of the Transcript. The record is otherwise de-
void of any other indication that Jeanne Bell's maturity 
level is any greater than the average fifteen-year-old. She 
is intelligent and she is sophisticated, but these qualities do 
not weigh heavily in her favor as an adequate mother and 
a fit and proper person for the custody and control of a 
minor child. 
On the contrary, the record shows that Jeanne Bell 
is emotionally immature. At page 7 of the Transcript she 
affirms her faith in her ability to care for this child. Her 
faith is based on a new religious affiliation cultivated since 
the minor child was placed with the Londons (T. 31). She 
also received legal counsel in the State of California and 
retained counsel to represent her in Utah. Her own attor-
ney in California told her she didn't know what she was 
doing, and that she was being foolish (T. 26). Her com-
posure at the hearing was unique in a girl of fifteen years. 
Yet, when Jeanne Bell was unhappy with her mother and 
an argument developed over the money being spent in the 
proceedings in Utah, she immediately penned a letter to 
her attorney advising him not to continue the matter and 
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that she was discontinuing her attempt to regain the cus-
tody of her natural-born child. 
At the hearing Jeanne Bell represented to the court 
that when Exhibit I was presented to her, she did not know 
some of her rights, and that she should have been1 advised 
on some points respecting the adoption of this child (T. 
7. 8). Her allegation is that she should have been allowed 
to discuss the matter with members of her family but the 
fact of the matter is that all of the members of her family 
were in her hospital room at the time the document was 
signed, and she had more than ample opportunity to dis,.. 
cuss it with her family prior to the birth of the baby, but 
admitted that the subject was not discussed in her house-
hold (T. 11). 
A page 4 of the Transcript, Jeanne Bell states in noun-
certain terms that all along she was secretly planning on 
keeping her child and fighting to get it back at some future 
date, and then at page 14 the following is recorded. 
Q. When did you first discover, Miss Bell that 
you did not attend to have this baby remain with 
the Londons? 
A. Three weeks or a month later. 
Q. Did you discuss this with your mother? 
A. Well. I wanted to, but I was kind of reluct-
ant to. 
Q. At any time did she consent to your obtain-
ing this child back during these discussions? 
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A. Not at first, but later when she knew I real-
ly wanted the baby back she did. 
And again, on page 15: 
Q. Yes. Is this true between the time you signed 
Exhibit 1 and the time that Exxhibits 2 and 3 were 
sent to me, you made no inquiry concerning this 
child. Is that correct? To me or to the Londons? 
A. Oh no, I called my doctor. 
Q. But made no inquiries to me or to the 
Londons? 
A. As I say, I did not know my rights, and I 
couldn't contact them. 
Q. Isn't it true that a copy of Exhibit 1 was left 
with you? You had a copy all the time, and on that 
copy it said "Bean and Bean" on the bottom, "Lay-
ton, Utah," does it not? 
A. Yes. 
Q. So this was in your possession all the time, 
is this correct? 
A. Yes, that is correct. 
The first indication that things were not going well in 
California came by way of Exhibits 2 and 3 addressed to 
counsel for petitioners-appellants. Jeanne Bell had coun-
sel's address right on her copy of Exhibit 1, but for a ten-
month period she made no attempt to contact petition-
E'rs-appellants or their counsel to make known her 
dissatisfaction. 
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Jeanne Bell and her mother, Barbara Bell, were act-
ually fraudulent in their representation1s to the Londons at 
the time the baby was placed for adoption. Exhibit 1, set 
forth in full in the Statement of F1acts, was the agreement 
8igned by Jeanne Bell and her mother, Barbara Bell, and 
states the father of the child in unknown1, but in fact 
Jeanne Bell did know the name of the natural father, and 
so did her mother (T. 17). In fact, it was Jeanne Bell's rep-
resenatiton at the hearing that the baby was born as the 
result of a rape committeed upon her by the natural father, 
Johnny Wright. She told her mother this and her mother 
told the doctor. Apparently Barbara Bell was not advised 
of this when it occurred, because she was so shocked when 
she discovered that her daughter was pregnant (T. 22, 40). 
No criminal action was ever brought against Mr. Wright, 
and Jeanne Bell and lVIr. Wright had conversations after 
the child was placed with petitioners-appellants (T. 21, 22; 
see also Sloan Dep. 8, 12, 13, and Drennen Dep.) 
POINT III 
IT IS IN THE BEST INTEREST AND WELFARE 
OF SAID MINOR CHILD THAT SHE REMAIN WITH 
PETITIONERS, AND THAT THEY BE ALLOWED TO 
PROCEED WITH ADOPTION. 
This child is a happy, well adjusted, normal two-year-
old girl, with a place in a family that belongs to her. After 
two years of love and affection and the giving of herself 
in response to the attention, surroundings, and atmosphere 
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of the London home, this infant child has some rights to 
he considered. At the time of her birth she was totally re-
jected by her natural mother, and Barbara Bell refused 
the responsibility for her care. With an abundance of love, 
the pPtitioners at that very instant were willing to provide 
something that the natural mother and Barbara Bell were 
not prepared to provide, to wit: An acceptance of the baby 
for what she was, and not for what she represented the 
natural mother to be. The situation has not materially 
changed from the date the child was born. Jeanne Bell is 
an unmarried female, age 16. She has two more years of 
high school and no immediate prospects of marriage and 
the establishment of a home of her own. The transcript is 
replete with evidence that Mrs. Bell can no longer control 
her adopted daughter, and that in fact she conforms her 
views to those expressed by Jeanne Bell (T. 55, 56). That 
there is contention in the home concerning finances and 
the possible position this child would have in the home is 
amply demonstrated by the testimony of Jeanne Bell con-
cerning the letter she wrote to her attorney, which was 
never mailed (T. 110, 111 ). 
In the findings of fact supporting the decision of the 
Juvenile Court, paragraph 7 states that "Barbara Bell has 
promised to support both the mother and said child and aid 
in caring for said child until the mother has obtained her 
education and is emancipated" (R. 13). After nine months 
of pregnancy, Barbara Bell had a wonderful opportunity 
to take this infant child to her heart and to her home and 
expend her resources in caring for this child, but she re-
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fused to do so. In the words of Jeanne Bell at page 10 of 
the transcript: 
Yes, she told me to sign it, that I was too young to 
take care of it and the responsibility, that she 
couldn't take on the responsibility either. 
The Londons were willing to take that responsibility with 
no questions asked, and they committeed all of their re-
sources to the welfare and happiness of that infant child 
when those who had the primary responsibility refused to 
do so. 
CONCLUSION 
A consideration of the background and home life pres-
ently enjoyed by his minor child, as contrasted with that 
which the natural mother could provide is undoubtedly a 
major consideration, and in view of the fact situation pre-
sented, the child certainly is entitled to the stability and 
love evident in the appellant's home. 
The element of contract and representation, and 
change of position based on the representations. are pres--
ent in this case beyond any doubt, and abandonment is 
clear. 
We therefore respectfully submit that the decree of 
the Juvenile Court should be reversed, and the minor child 
should be left in the custody of petitioners-appellants pre-
paratory to adoption, and the natural mother should be 
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rermanently deprived of the custody and control of Mara-
lee London, a minor. 
Respectfully submitted, 
DAVID E. BEAN 
Bean and Bean 
50 North Main Street 
Layton, Utah 
Attorneys for Appellants L 
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